The frustrating socio-economic situation prompted Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old fruit seller, to set himself on fire as a symbol of protest in Tunisia. As a trigger for an unbearable reality, the Arab population rose up in many countries to protest against autocracy and demand rights and justice.
In March 2011, in Syria, some children were arrested and tortured for drawing graffiti against the then-president, Bashar al-Assad, on the wall of their school in Daraa. Popular outrage turned into widespread protests against the regime, demanding the release of political prisoners and reforms of all kinds for the country. Given how quickly their counterparts in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt fell, al-Assad’s response was repression, which degenerated into a bloody civil war that continues to this day.
Bashar al-Assad is the son of Hafez al-Assad, Syria’s dictator since the 1971 coup. The regime’s ideology is based on the Ba’ath party, which is rooted in Arab socialism, nationalism and pan-Arabism. Its name could be translated as ‘renaissance’, alluding to the revival of Arab nations after independence from Western powers. To understand this, it is necessary to go back to colonial history, when a logic of territorial and border division alien to the Arab people was imposed, transforming the administrative and political organisation that had previously functioned.
Hafez al-Assad’s coup brought stability for the first time since independence. However, it also brought an authoritarian system where repression was the norm.
Since the 16th century Syria had been part of the Ottoman Empire, along with Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and the territories now occupied by the Israeli government. After its defeat in World War I, Syria became part of the French mandate for Syria and Lebanon, and its independence did not come until after World War II. With artificially created borders and a French government that exacerbated differences and conflicts among a diverse population, the early years of independence were characterised by instability, with some 20 changes of government in just the first 10 years.
Hafez al-Assad’s coup brought stability for the first time since independence. However, it also brought an authoritarian system where repression was the norm. Power was centralised, and the most important positions were filled by trusted individuals. Initially, the regime attracted economic openness, some political inclusion and a defence of religious diversity. However, corruption and patronage soon followed, and opposition flourished. With the al-Assad regime being part of the Shia Alawite minority (around 12% of the population), the Sunni majority (around 70%) felt disadvantaged early on, triggering a number of anti-regime actions that were harshly repressed.
When Bashar succeeded his father after his death in 2000, there was hope for some reformism. However, when the protests began in 2011, al-Assad’s repression was brutal. Since the beginning of the war, Bashar has ruled with an iron fist. An opposition to the regime, based on an armed insurgency comprising various groups with different interests, was structured and formed.
One of the strongest opposition groups is the Islamist organisation Hayat Tahrir El Sham (HTS). Also prominent in the opposition are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Kurdish militias; the Syrian National Army (SNA) formed by military personnel who defected from al-Assad’s army; and the Islamic State (ISIS), the jihadist organisation that in 2014 imposed the caliphate including territories in Iraq and Syria, but with minimal influence today. The opposition to al-Assad’s regime is neither unified nor organised, but is characterised by the existence of several open fronts and various conflicts between factions defending their own interests. There is also room for the strategic interests of international powers, with support for the respective parties involved.
In the final years of the war, al-Assad’s government was severely weakened, and a status quo seemed to have been established in which the Syrian government was in charge of the country, but territorial control was divided into zones, with one controlled by HTS, one controlled by the SNA (and largely supported by Turkey) and one by Kurdish organisations (supported by the United States) [3]. In general, Western countries sought to support and arm opposition groups in pursuit of al-Assad’s downfall. However, geopolitical interests are shifting, diverse and intertwined.
These 14 years of war in Syria have caused more than half a million deaths, of which it is estimated that more than 300,000 were civilians [4], more than 150,000 people have been detained and disappeared [5], and more than half of the Syrian population, some 13.5 million people, have been forced to flee their homes.
On 8 December 2024 the situation in Syria changed abruptly when the opposition, led by HTS, took control of the country in just 11 days and forced al-Assad to flee the country. Thousands of people took to the streets to celebrate al-Assad’s defeat and demand freedom.
The fall of the dictator has ended a more than 50-year dictatorship in the country and a bloody 13-year war. Now, war crimes are beginning to be made public, and deadly victims are appearing in prisons. Of the more than 150,000 disappeared, only 20,000 people have been found, creating a state of despair [7]. Although al-Assad’s media initially tried to label the uprising as ‘terrorist’, videos broadcast by journalists have shown that the overthrow of the regime was not accompanied by violence [8]. Geir Pedersen, the UN special envoy for Syria, has reported that the groups now in control of Damascus have appealed for the protection of civilians and the formation of a ‘unity and inclusive’ government representing the country’s many ethnic and religious communities [9].
The new government, in place for the next three months, is already being formed with strong HTS figures at the helm, such as HTS leader Mohammed al-Golani and the now interim prime minister Mohammed al-Bashir. From the outset, HTS set as its goal the suspension of the previous government and the reconfiguration of a new one based on institutions, as well as a ‘people’s elected council’ and no ‘single governor making arbitrary decisions’ [11].
The challenges ahead for the Syrian transition are many and varied, given the effort involved in consolidating a new government in a country whose borders are 79 years old, 53 of which have been a tyranny. Moreover, the starting point is complicated, as the 13 years of war have left the country devastated. The economy has contracted by 84% from 2010 to 2023 [12], being reclassified in 2018 by the World Bank as a low-income country. The social situation is very precarious, with extreme poverty and difficult access to livelihood opportunities, high inflation, food insecurity and a worsening of basic services such as health, education and sanitation, among others [13].
In addition to the multiple internal challenges facing the Syrians, potential obstacles that international powers may impose must also be taken into account. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the Israeli government has already seized the moment to expand into the Golan Heights, Syrian territory occupied since the Six Day War (1967). The Israeli bombing campaign has already destroyed basic infrastructure and caused civilian injuries and fatalities, which is being blamed for worsening the situation in Syria.
Although there is great uncertainty about what might come in the future, this is a historic moment for the country and its people, and there are high hopes for the positive development of the Syrian transition. So far, there is a prevailing will for unity among internal Syrian voices. Even in areas controlled by factions opposed to HTS, where it is also possible to hear the slogan ‘The Syrian people are one’ [15]. It seems that the primary focus is on achieving a peaceful transition to a new government and constitution that accommodates the interests of all parties involved and puts the Syrian people first.
Ainara García Sánchez
References
[1] Alfarah, C. (2016) “El vacío de Siria”, 5W, November 2016. Available at: https://www.revista5w.com/temas/conflictos/el-vacio-de-siria-7383
[2] Cooper, K. (2017). “View of Old Aleppo”. Available at: https://www.instagram.com/p/BWctgpzg0l5/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=MzRlODBiNWFlZA==
[3] Kopel, E. (2024) “¿Cómo se derrumbó el régimen sirio?”, Nueva Sociedad, Available at: https://nuso.org/articulo/siria-assad/
[4] United Nations (2023): “Behind the data: Recording civilian casualties in Syria” Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2023/05/behind-data-recording-civilian-casualties-syria
[5] Ali Mustafa, W. (2024): “Cruelty, Torture, and Disappearance in Assad’s Syria: Thirteen Years and Counting” The Tahrir Institute. Available at: https://timep.org/2024/03/14/cruelty-torture-and-disappearance-in-assads-syria-thirteen-years-and-counting/
[6] Al Sati, A. y Al Jamaat, M. (2024): “La oposición siria regresa a Alepo: ¿qué está sucediendo en Siria?”, Baynana, 3 December 2024. Available at: https://baynana.es/es/la-oposicion-siria-regresa-a-alepo-que-esta-sucediendo-en-siria/
[7]Mohammad, O. “Nuestra esperanza tiembla ante la magnitud del desafío en la Siria posterior a El Asad” El País. Available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2024-12-11/nuestra-esperanza-tiembla-ante-la-magnitud-del-desafio-en-la-siria-posterior-a-el-asad.html
[8] Al Sati, A. y Al Jamaat, M. (2024): “La oposición siria regresa a Alepo: ¿qué está sucediendo en Siria?”, Baynana, 3 December 2024. Available at: https://baynana.es/es/la-oposicion-siria-regresa-a-alepo-que-esta-sucediendo-en-siria/
[9] The New York Times (2024). “Siria después de Bashar al Asad: qué está ocurriendo y qué viene ahora”, 12 de diciembre de 2024. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/es/2024/12/12/espanol/mundo/siria-futuro.html
[10] Morales, A. (2024). “El latido de Siria”. 5W. 3 December 2024. Available at: https://www.revista5w.com/temas/conflictos/el-latido-de-siria-118880
[11] CNN (2024). “Syrian rebel leader says goal is to ‘overthrow’ Assad regime”, 6 December 2024. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/06/middleeast/syria-rebel-forces-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-al-jolani-intl-latam/index.html
[12] World Bank (2024). “Syria Economic Monitor, Spring 2024: Conflict, Crises, and the Collapse of Household Welfare” Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-economic-monitor-spring-2024-conflict-crises-and-collapse-household-welfare-enar
[13] World Bank (2022). “The World Bank In Syrian Arab Republic” Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/overview
[14] Morales A. (2024) “Libertado ocupada”, 5W. 20 December 2024. Available at: https://www.revista5w.com/temas/conflictos/libertad-ocupada-119318
[15] Gómez, L. (2024). “Caen 50 años de tiranía”, El País, 9 December 2024. Available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2024-12-09/caen-50-anos-de-tirania.html?ssm=TW_CC?event_log=oklogin
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